

Forum: Disarmament Commission

Issue: Preventing the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Sahel Region.

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Introduction

In 2025, the global number of deaths by terrorism has halved since 2007; conversely, deaths through terrorism in the Sahel region has increased from 1% of the global number to making up over half the deaths on the global scale. The Sahel has been increasingly threatened by violent religious extremist groups and bandits seeking to expand their wealth and outreach. In addition to these groups, intercommunal tensions and competition over scarce water and resources heighten conflict within the Sahel's communities. Civilians face threats of kidnapping, displacement, and death. The need for such groups to attack and for communities to defend themselves creates a demand for firearms that criminals in the illegal firearms trade have profited from.

Demand necessitates a supply. These firearms are sourced illegally through multiple ways. Internationally, France's counterinsurgency programs have supplied groups in the Sahel with military equipment. Similarly, Turkey is one of the main suppliers of weapons for the militaries of the countries in the Sahel region; its proximity to Nigeria opens opportunities for smuggling and illegal trade. However, the majority of firearm supply still comes from within Africa. Diverted military equipment and legacy weapons from previous conflicts in the region offer high-quality firearms to groups, and artisanal production of firearms offer cheaper alternatives. This accessibility to weaponry perpetuates acts of violence between groups and civilians in the Sahel.

Regional political instability slows down actions taken to regulate proliferation of firearms. Past coups and attacks on governmental institutions have weakened national capabilities to seize control of the situation. Lack of government regulations increases the ability for criminal groups to diffuse weaponry, which in turn creates regional turmoil, placing the Sahel region in a feed back loop that renders governments unable to fully address the issue in an effective manner. Therefore, intervention by international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), plays a key role in aiding governments in preventing the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weaponry.

Definition of Key Terms

The Sahel

The Sahel region refers to the semiarid northcentral area of Africa, consisting of the countries Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.




Figure 1: A map of Northern Africa outlining the territory the Sahel region and the countries within

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

SALWs are defined in the UN's International Tracing Instrument as any form of weaponry that is man-portable, lethal, and is designed to expel or launch projectiles. Small arms consist of weapons carried and operated by a single individual, such as but not limited to self-loading pistols, rifles, revolvers, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, and assault rifles. Light weapons are similarly portable, but operated through a team including grenade launchers, anti-tank guns, and heavy machine guns. Portable explosives such as grenades and land mines are also regarded to be SALWs.

Legacy Weapons

Arms are made to be durable. These arms that are passed down through multiple generations are referred to as legacy weapons. In the Sahel, legacy weapons may date back to the 60's or the 80's, made and dispersed in Cold War conflicts. Many are sourced from national stockpiles.

Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups refer to any community where the large majority of members possess firearms for defensive or offensive purposes that do not operate under the instructions of the government. These groups can be highly organized and extensive, such as al-Qaeda branches in the Sahel, or simple civilian groups of agricultural or pastoral communities seeking safety from regional instability.

Background

In 2011, the Libyan state collapsed with the defeat of Muammar Gaddafi. The president's vast stockpile of weaponry was then plundered and proliferated as the country's growing social unrest became civil war, sparking the vast network of illicit small arms trading across the region. Although the United Nations has imposed an arms embargo in Libya since 2011, weaponry continues to pass through the region down into the Sahel, increasing violence and instability in the region as extremist or hostile groups grow due to the accessibility of weapons. These illicit small arms and light weapons do not only consist of Gaddafi's own stockpile; manufacturing logos reveal firearms trafficked internationally or made locally. As violent groups grow more powerful, civilians are forced to take arms for defence as they are subjected to raids, kidnappings, and killings. The tri-border region Liptako–Gourma specifically, between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, has experienced a massive escalation of violence in the past decade, where national security forces and community militias engage in violent and bloody conflicts that have caused massive population displacement. The constant demand of weaponry for both defense and crime places the Sahel region in a precarious situation that must be handled thoroughly and efficiently in order to ensure civilians are not plagued by violence.

Sourcing SALWs

Much of the arms that arms trafficking groups are able to seize is through taking advantage of counterinsurgency military operations. In 2013, taking advantage of a Tuareg rebellion, a jihadist group was able to take control of Northern Mali. The French then commenced Operation Serval, a military operation that successfully resecured Mali; due to its success, the French extended their military operation in 2014 to cover the regions of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (former colonies of the French empire) in Operation Barkhane. France deployed around 3,000 soldiers in an effort for counterterrorism. Governments in the region supply national militaries with weapons to protect civilians, governmental institutions, and security outposts from terrorist attacks, with the Republic of Türkiye being a main arms manufacturer governments in the Sahel rely on. While the success of such operations varies, it is a constant that these operations introduce a vast arsenal of armaments that criminal trafficking groups can plunder.

Military, gendarmerie, and police outposts across the Sahel countries are targeted for their weapons and ammunition. SALWs are also diverted from official government stocks in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, as well as peacekeeping forces these countries employ. In 2020, Burkina Faso's government established a group called the *Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie* (VDP) for national self-defense. However, they quickly became targets for extremists for their weapons and to deter collaboration with the state. The Africa Defense Forum has found that a majority of illicit weapons are sourced from national military bases, either through battlefield plundering, base raids, or corrupt officials.

Contrary to what Hollywood may depict, much of the illicit weaponry sourced is still produced from within the Sahel region. Complex, underground weapons trade takes a backseat; the region's supply comes mainly from the aforementioned raids on national defence and artisanal production. Legacy weapons from past conflicts make

up a large part of these illicit weapons. Armed groups from past rebellions, such as the aforementioned Tuareg rebellion in Mali, retained their SALWs after the conflict. Additionally, because smuggling of military-grade firearms across borders is high risk, these weapons are expensive, where local illicit production of arms still makes up the majority of proliferated small arms and light weapons in the Sahel, especially for non-extremist groups seeking defence. Burkina Faso estimated that 60 % of seized SALWs in 2016 were of artisanal production. The Nigerian National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey revealed that 17% of the rural population and 10% of the urban population owned artisanal weapons. Between 2014 and 2020, around half of the seized weapons reported in Mali were artisanal. However, if conflicts increase, this may cause for these markets to lessen as individuals or groups seek to upgrade their weaponry, or as industrially produced weapons become more available in the illicit trade. These weapons are made throughout West and Central Africa, with Ghana being a major provider.

Since weapons are obtained through such a wide variety of sources, markets for SALWs are highly decentralized, making them extremely difficult to regulate and uncover. Open markets, however, selling illicit firearms and weaponry exist, often located in small towns along strategic corridors. In 2021, the UN Panel of Experts on Mali reported that the village of Agazragane, Mali, although not being controlled by any armed group, is the largest weapons market in the region. Similarly, Ber, near Timbuktu, is at a crossroads between Mali's largest cities, Timbuktu and Gao, therefore being a market for smuggled products from Algeria. Towns and villages known for weapons trafficking are areas with low state presence along borders or transport routes, serving as a hub for both criminal activities as well as arms trafficking. Ethnic connections fuel this trade, both bringing mutual connection and heightening conflicts. A Malian government official has identified that Arab communities that sell weaponry in Ber have tribal connections in Libya, facilitating routes of exchange and opening cross-border markets. Many conflicts and criminal groups have an underlying ethnic dimension, increasing hostilities and the demand for SALWs for protection.

Non-State Armed Groups

The main consumer of industrially produced SALWs are hostile religious extremist groups. In 2015, a shipment of weapons and ammunition was intercepted in Niger, identified to be affiliated to a terrorist group. Many similar reports have been given, both in regards to smuggling and in attack tactic analyses. In 2017, the Sahel region's official branch of Al Qaida, Jama'at Nus rat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) was established through the merging of the Ansar Dine, Katibat Ma cina, Al Mourabiton, and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb groups. They are active mainly in central and northern Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Niger, and have been expanding southwards in those nations and into Côte d'Ivoire, driving their demand for weaponry to retain control over their territories. Additionally, the split in the Boko Haram organization into the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) and Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), two rival radical Islamist groups, has caused violence in the Lake Chad region, thus fueling communal hostility and creating a demand for weaponry in their conflicts.


Despite the assumption that these groups heavily participate in the arms trafficking markets due to their organizations being terrorist groups that have caused civilian deaths and political instability, evidence suggests that

they are not primary engagers in the illicit trade of SALWs. Instead, groups like JNIM source their firearms from other criminal organizations in charge of smuggling, or through maintaining legacy weapons. When they disperse SALWs, they do not necessarily draw direct monetary value from the exchange; instead, JNIM provides weapons to communities they are protecting, allied groups, and those they desire to incorporate into their ranks, acting as an in-kind contribution. This transfer extends across borders; SALWs produced in Mali have been found in the 2021 attack in Togo, revealing the extent of this vast net of exchange and connections.

Cheaper, artisanal SALWs find their way not only into the hands of such organizations but in civilian communities. Competition over land, water, and other natural resources has historically been a point of conflict between agricultural and pastoralist communities. The expansion of land for cultivation in agricultural communities for a large population results in the increased contact of the two communities. As pastoral groups move with the seasons, their communities often end up accidentally intruding into land owned by agricultural communities, which may not have been used for agriculture in previous years. This expansion of agriculture, combined with climate variability, exacerbates these pressures by reducing the availability of water and pasture and pushing pastoral communities into areas where they have historically had fewer interactions with farming communities.

These conflicts are devastating for communities, as they are spontaneous and often fatal, making up a large part of the deaths resulting from illicit firearms. Additionally, this intercommunal violence has become increasingly tied to criminality and banditry. Nigeria in particular is extremely affected by this violence. Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) found that this intercommunal violence has caused more fatalities in the northern regions of Nigeria than Boko Haram has, and its casualty rate exceeds that of other Sahelian countries (see Figure 1). Armed groups involved in cattle rustling, robbery, kidnapping, and other forms of banditry have exploited existing tensions between communities to recruit members, conduct cattle raids, and establish control over rural territory or trade routes.

Farmer-Herder Conflict Fatalities by Country in the Sahel



Source: ACLED data, as analyzed by Kosec et al. (2026)

Figure 1: A line chart illustrating the number of fatalities due to farmer-herder conflict from 2010 to 2025 (IFPRI)

Violence exhibited by one community then creates a reason for other communities to arm themselves for self-defense or for retaliation. Therefore, farmers and pastoralists participate in the arms trade as they see it a necessity to protect themselves, their family, and property. As ethnic hostilities underly the region, bandit groups are often associated with a particular ethnic group, further polarizing opinions and encouraging communities to take arms in anticipating attacks. Consequently, self-defense militias or vigilante groups have been formed throughout the Sahel. In Mali, the Dozo and Dogon are traditional hunter groups that formed the self-defense organization Dan Na Ambassagou. In Burkina Faso, these self-defense militias have been legalized. Pastoralist communities have likewise armed themselves to protect their livestock and communities.

Enablers of trafficking

As illustrated, SALWs and the conflict in the Sahel is a catch-22 situation, where one enables the other; political and regional conflict enables the proliferation of SALWs and the proliferation of SALWs enables political and regional conflict. As this cycle continues, the demand for weaponry will only increase. Violent groups will seek out higher-grade weaponry to expand their influence further, and government militias and communities will need weapons to defend themselves from such groups.

Deficiencies in the law enforcement institutions of the nations in the Sahel contribute to the continuation of this situation. Sahel countries lack in law enforcement capacity. Limited policing and judicial capacity make it difficult to investigate weapons trafficking, apprehend perpetrators, secure stockpiles, and prosecute those responsible for armed violence. There is only a small portion of their population they are able to apprehend, convict, and imprison. Recent data reveals that Mali is able to hold only around 3,000 prisoners in overcrowded prisons, while deaths from such non-state actors continue to plague the country, with over 1,000 associated annually. Lack of prison space and population to carry out these enforcement measures enables these violent non-state groups to continue carrying out their acts of violence. Additionally, the establishment of armed peacekeepers proves to be precarious. As previously mentioned, supplying these militias and counterinsurgency programs only opens a new supply of firearms into the region, often worsening the violence and hostility between groups.

Ethnic conflict has shown itself to be a main driver of these violent encounters as well. Trafficking networks can rely on tribal or ethnic connections that cross national borders, creating trusted weapons diffusion routes and markets that formal law-enforcement institutions may struggle to penetrate. At the same time, when armed criminal groups are perceived as belonging to particular ethnic communities, communities targeted by them often interpret attacks as collective rather than individual threats. This encourages retaliatory violence, which stimulates the need for civilian armament.

As a result, the Sahel faces a self-reinforcing security dilemma. Armed groups acquire weapons because other groups possess them, governments supply arms to security forces and auxiliaries because armed groups threaten them, and civilians arm themselves because neither governments nor armed groups can guarantee security. The illicit trade of SALWs, consequently, has become a large market in the region. Breaking this cycle requires addressing both the supply of weapons and the conditions that create a demand for them: weak state authority, communal insecurity, black markets, farmer–pastoralist disputes, and the inadequate disarmament of the Sahel.

Major Parties Involved

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS has been a central actor in addressing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Sahel, with its members including key Sahelian states such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. In 2006, the organization held the 2006 Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which, after entering into force in 2009, requires member states to obtain approval from the President of the ECOWAS Commission before importing any military equipment, and mandates the marking and tracing of arms within the community to prevent illicit activities. Apart from multiple other attempts to resolve this issue, ECOWAS has also engaged with the United States on regional stability and SALW proliferation.

African Union (AU)

The AU, as a continental organization, positions Africa's experience with armed conflicts and the negative consequences of illicit weapons proliferation as a major issue that requires coordinated regional action. AU has developed multiple approaches, such as the African Common Position on the Arms Trade Treaty and the AU Master Roadmap for Silencing the Guns in Africa, standing firm in promoting collaboration among member states. To add on, as center of this conflict, solutions such as allowing voluntary surrender of illicit SALW without fear of prosecution in the annual Africa Amnesty Month, and calling on member states to institute effective transfer lines, have also been implemented. The AU's approach emphasizes regional cooperation, with a specific focus on the development of common standards for marking and tracing along with legislative enforcement.

European Union (EU)

The EU takes part in this issue through supporting physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in SALW and ammunition in the Sahel, implemented along with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs through the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The EU's stance is influenced by the recognition that inadequate PSSM in existing arms and ammunition depots in the Sahel poses a serious challenge to peace and security, particularly given how in the past, government-owned stockpiles have been looted in Libya and Mali. The EU also supports UNODC efforts to promote the Firearms Protocol and provides financial support to the Regional Centre on Small Arms based in Nairobi.

In the European Parliament, there are several major transnational groups. The centre-right European People's Party (EPP) is deeply Christian and known for supporting democracy, while the centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) is more focused on social justice and climate action. The Greens, similar to the name, are champions of environmental sustainability and social equity. The nationalist Identity and Democracy (ID) want to limit EU power and prioritize national sovereignty and agency.

United Nations (UN)

The UN's role is especially important regarding this topic considered that it is the largest global organization with the ability to pass resolutions and provide funding. In the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), enforcement of this action is emphasized along with specification of the importance of access to data and information provided by states on a voluntary basis and national reports. Additionally, in the UNODC's Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (TOCTA Sahel), the UN also warns states of the violent extremist groups that propel this movement further. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs also serves as the implementation partner for the EU's PSSM project in the Sahel.

State of Libya

Libya has suffered profoundly from this issue. Before the 2011 revolution, Libya maintained a strict arms control policy, with the national stockpile, under the regime of Qaddafi, far exceeding the military's actual requirements. However, this was disrupted by the Libyan Revolution, leading to the abandonment of weapons stockpiles and widespread theft by armed groups and militias. This transformed Libya into a major arms trafficker in the region. Although the majority of arms outflow occurred in 2012 and 2013, the consequences has led to a series of effects on neighboring states and more distant conflicts. Libya diplomats have called for international collaboration based on the exchange of information and support for affected states on the conditions that efforts in combating this issue must not infringe upon state's sovereignty in the right to possess weapons for legitimate self-defense.

Republic of Chad

Chad is especially vulnerable in its geographic location—it shares borders with Sudan and Libya, two states deeply affected by armed conflict. Chad puts an emphasis placing civilian disarmament at the center of national peace consolidation efforts. In article 56 of Chad's 2018 Constitution, it clearly states to strictly prohibit civilians from possessing and carrying weapons of war, with conditions for civilian firearms to be determined by law. Chad has also engaged with the Arms Trade Treaty framework, sharing practical approaches to weapon control to prevent to non-state armed groups and criminal networks.

Republic of Mali

Mali has validated a National Action Plan 2026–2030 with a mapping of artisanal manufacturers, standard operating procedures, and a weapons registry, receiving support from the United Nations Development Programme. Mali's view of SALW proliferation as a direct obstacle to peace and social cohesion is furthered by its commitments at both national and international levels, reflecting its position as a state at the frontline of the Sahel crisis.

Internationally, Mali supports improving and building upon existing tracing techniques and maintaining regional defense in the AES alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger. Civil society groups, like GENSAC, have also

worked in Mali, with a stronger focus on how national plans can reach smaller communities—even until now, many people still remain uninformed of frameworks like the Arms Trade Treaty and it is crucial to spread awareness. Survivor-centered care was also a key component of their work. Between August 2024 and September 2025, there were over 4,000 conflict deaths, with more than 40 percent targeting civilians. Overall, Mali prioritizes state-centric security and regional military cooperation.

Islamic Republic of Mauritania

Mauritania has gained a positive reputation in this topic, recognized as a stabilizing actor in the Sahel. Particularly, NATO's defense capacity-building program head had noted the country as the only official NATO partner in the Sahel. Mauritanian diplomacy emphasizes the interdependence of national and regional security, operating on their national belief that Mauritania cannot watch neighbors suffer without eventually receiving the repercussions itself.

It is important to note that Mauritania is NATO's only official partner in the Sahel, which makes it the last country in its region acting as an anchor where Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have turned to Russia and drifted away from Western forces. For Mauritania, this partnership is also crucial, as it brings high-level equipment and intelligence support that Mauritania at the current time does not possess. Additionally, Mauritania hosts over 300,000 Malian refugees and shares a 2,000 km border with Mali, currently a state in chaos. Its current stability helps prevent the Sahel crisis from expanding further into West Africa, benefiting Europe and NATO. Ultimately, it is a country deeply tied with Europe and would seek for further collaboration regarding this issue.

Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue

- The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 4 December 2023 (A/RES/ 78/46)
- Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them, 7 December 2020 (A/RES/75/56)
- Resolution 2370 (2017) on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons, 2 August 2017 (S/RES/ 2370)
- Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing MINUSMA (the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), 25 April 2013 (S/RES/2100)
- ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, 14 June 2006 adopted and 29 September 2009 entered into force ECOWAS Declaration of Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, 31 October 1998 Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 1 December 2000 AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silencing the Guns in Africa, adopted 2016 and extended to 2030

Possible Solutions

Strengthening Management

To address gaps in tracking illicit weapons flows, delegates could propose expanding existent frameworks and mechanisms, such as the UN's International Tracing Instrument (ITI), and transforming it into a binding regional protocol for the Sahel. This would mean that all states are now required to mark their weapons during the manufacturing process and during imports, in addition to sharing tracing data through a centralized database. Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) programs could also be enforced and enlarged through allowing international experts to conduct regular audits of state arsenals and providing technical support for the destruction of surplus weapons. In response to potential calls on infringing sovereignty, correlating compliance and active collaboration to development assistance and funding would prevent resistance through creating strong incentives for cooperation while respecting national sovereignty.

Border Security

An extremely important factor in perpetrating illegal weapon trafficking lies in the Sahel's unstable borders. To address this issue, delegates could advocate for the establishment of a joint force assigned to the Sahel's various borders under the protection of the African Union, with a mandate to conduct coordinated patrols and prevent illicit shipments while sharing intelligence on trafficking networks. This force could operate alongside existing frameworks like the G5 Sahel Joint Force, funded from the UN and bilateral partners.

Disarmament and Reintegration

Communities in the Sahel often hold weapons as a means of self-protection in a unstable area or as responses to past conflicts. Delegates could, therefore, create community programs focusing on disarmament, offering incentives such as development support and funding or vocational training in exchange for voluntary weapons surrender. Of course, in consideration to the diverse backgrounds of local communities in the Sahel, delegates should implement culturally sensitive policies with consultation to the local leaders. Weapons collected should be securely stored, marked, and destroyed under international supervision. These efforts should be tied to the long-term and broader peacebuilding initiatives, which would ensure that former weapons holders are successfully reintegrated into society and that the root causes of demand for weapons, like insecurity, marginalization, and weak, failing governance, are addressed.

Capacity Building

Many Sahelian states lack the institutional capacity to enforce control measures effectively over the region. Delegates could propose a Sahel Arms Control Capacity fund dedicated to magnifying the Sahel's arms control capacity, which would be financed and managed by UNODA and ECOWAS. This fund would prioritize training for law enforcement, the modernization of national arms registries, and the development of legal frameworks aligned with international standards. In addition, technical assistance provided by the international community

could also support the establishment of national commissions and strengthen their ability to coordinate across government agencies.

Tackling Illicit Financial Flows and Trafficking Networks

Weapons trafficking is often deeply correlated with organized financial transactions and crime. To combat this issue, delegates could attempt to expand oversight through creating coordination hubs working with the regional bodies to track and disrupt the financing of arms trafficking networks. This would involve strengthening anti-money laundering frameworks and promoting cross-border cooperation among financial intelligence units. A contribution-based model could link states' participation in compliance to deferred help guarantees during emergencies. This would tie their cooperation directly to security outcomes, encouraging transparency while ensuring that all member states have the capacity to minimize potential illegal financial activities involved in illicit weapons trade.

Regional and International Cooperation

Delegates could encourage the creation of a coordination organization that would serve as a central platform for information exchange and operations planning between states. At the international level, formal partnerships between UNODA, INTERPOL, and regional organizations like ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel should be strengthened to link arms control with broader peace and security objectives

Leverage Financial Intelligence in Detecting Arms Trafficking and Countering Correlated Terrorism

Aside from only building new institutions, delegates could also strengthen existing Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) cooperation through the Egmont Group, which connects over 175 FIUs globally and provides secure information exchange platforms. Delegates could advocate for realtime intelligence on suspicious transactions that are linked to trafficking networks. A specialized working group could be established within Egmont prioritizing the financing of weapons trafficking —this would include methods not only limited to general money laundering technology. Delegates could propose to develop further the technology to identify specific patterns such as structured payments for arms shipments and exploitation of virtual assets for cross-border arms payments.

Combined with the above, delegates should also recognize that arms trafficking networks often overlap with terrorist financing structures. In the FATF's 2012 revisions, measures against proliferation financing were integrated into the 40 Recommendations. A focused solution would require states to screen financial flows for indicators linked to both arms trafficking and terrorism. This could include collaboration between FIUs and counterterrorism authorities in constructing a detailed analysis and interpretation on how arms sellers and terrorist groups interact in specific regions and contexts.

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